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Saudi equity research · Tadawul Main Market & Nomu
Research › Telecom › Zain KSA

Mobile Telecommunication Company Saudi Arabia (Zain KSA)

The smallest and the most leveraged, which on a fixed-cost network is the hardest place to stand. It has stayed below its cost of capital in every year covered here, though the gap has narrowed, and the distance between what it earns on sales and what reaches shareholders is where the story sits.

Tadawul 7030 · The sub-scale third · FY2018 to FY2025
As a customer If you want a signal wherever you are
Net revenues
SAR 11.0B
FY2025
Net profits
SAR 604M
continuing operations
less
-0.7pt
7.8% against 8.6%
See the workings
Revenue growth
+6.0%
vs FY2024
See the workings
EBITDA margin
35.1%
before capital charges
See the workings
Free cash flow
SAR 1.5B
after capital spending
Dividends per share
SAR 0.50
declared
See the workings
Debt to equity
0.79x
balance-sheet risk
See the workings

Source FY2025 audited financial statements, restated in the modelWorkings data appendixUpdated 24 September 2026

The read

Zain KSA converts sales into gross profit better than either competitor and converts it into shareholder return worse. Gross margin is 59.9%, the highest of the three. Net margin is 5.5%, the lowest. Everything that happens between those two lines is depreciation on an asset base it still has to carry and interest on the debt that funded it.

That is what sub-scale looks like on a fixed-cost network. Revenue of SAR 11.0B is 10.1% of the industry, and the same network economics that reward stc for being large penalize Zain for being small. It earns 7.8% on capital that costs 8.6%, a spread of -0.7pt, which leaves it short of the line in all 8 years covered here. Debt to equity of 0.79x against an industry median of 0.28x, with interest covered only 5.7x over, leaves the equity the most sensitive in the industry to any move in the cost of debt.

Two things complicate the picture, in opposite directions. Zain sold 8,069 towers to a PIF-led consortium in a deal completed in January 2023, so its capital expenditure of 4.5% of revenue is not comparable with peers who still own theirs: the economics did not vanish, they reappeared as lease payments. Against that, receivables are the industry's worst at 168 days outstanding against a median of 131, and that is a collections problem rather than a structural one, which means it is fixable.

The bet it made

Bought coverage Reach on the smallest budget. Betting on signal.
Spectrum Low-band only in the 2024 auction. Widest 5G availability in the Kingdom at 88%.
Data centers None disclosed.
Cable and fibre Saudi landing party through Zain Omantel International. Access without ownership.
Towers Sold first: 8,069 towers in 2023, for cash plus a retained 20% stake in the buyer.

Zain bought coverage. With the smallest budget of the three it bought the physics that lets a small network cover a large country, and it worked: Zain has the widest 5G availability in the Kingdom at 88%, achieved with no towers of its own and the smallest capital spending in the industry.

It is doubling down on assets it does not own. Zain was the first of the three to sell its towers, for SAR 3.03B in cash plus a retained 20% stake in the buyer. It took only low-band spectrum in the 2024 auction while operating in a market that increasingly asks for high-speed service, which leaves a network gap it can currently only fund on credit.

stc, Mobily, Zain KSA, 2018 to 2025stc, Mobily, Zain KSA, 2018 to 2025 The figures are listed in the table below this chart.0%10%20%30%1819202122232425
stcMobilyZain KSA
Chart data
20182019202020212022202320242025
stc18.8%20.9%18.4%13.0%11.8%13.6%15.7%15.2%
Mobily15.1%15.6%24.5%15.0%15.5%12.1%14.7%16.4%
Zain KSA20.2%24.3%23.1%13.8%14.8%15.4%6.8%4.5%
Capital expenditure as a share of revenue. The 2018 to 2020 peak is the 5G build. What happens afterwards is a strategy choice, and it is where the three separate.

Where the money comes from

Retail

Zain is squeezed in the middle and has quietly stopped fighting on that ground. It cannot outspend stc and cannot out-discount Mobily, so it went sideways: Yaqoot as a separate cheap digital brand to compete on price, and Tamam, a consumer finance arm lending to customers it already has. Zain's answer to being third is to stop monetizing the SIM and start monetizing the relationship.

Enterprise

This is where Zain is weakest, and it is the direct cost of its own strategy. Enterprise is asset-heavy: fibre into the building, data centers to host the workload, security accreditations, a large field sales force. Zain sold its towers and runs deliberately asset-light. The same choice that makes it efficient in consumer coverage disqualifies it here.

Wholesale

Zain chose partnership over ownership. With no infrastructure of its own to rent out domestically, it works through Zain Omantel International and acts as the Saudi landing party for cables it does not own outright. Asset-light again, earning from the traffic without funding the pipe.

What it does with the money

Zain discloses no data-center capacity at all. On every layer of reinvestment it is getting access without paying for the asset, which is the cheapest way to run a network and the hardest way to build a moat.

Which leaves the sentence the whole company turns on: as a customer, Zain gives you the most. As an investor, so far, it has given you the least.

What comes back to shareholders

Of what it earned in FY2025, Zain KSA declared SAR 0.50 a share, 74.4% of net profit, against free cash flow of SAR 1.5B. Every riyal a telecom earns arrives at the same fork: back into the network, or out to shareholders. That ratio is the answer this one gave.

In context

This company only means something next to the other two and against the economics of the industry they share.

Read the industry piece See it against the others