Source FY2025 audited financial statements, restated in the modelWorkings data appendixUpdated 24 September 2026
The read
Zain KSA converts sales into gross profit better than either competitor and converts it into shareholder return worse. Gross margin is 59.9%, the highest of the three. Net margin is 5.5%, the lowest. Everything that happens between those two lines is depreciation on an asset base it still has to carry and interest on the debt that funded it.
That is what sub-scale looks like on a fixed-cost network. Revenue of SAR 11.0B is 10.1% of the industry, and the same network economics that reward stc for being large penalize Zain for being small. It earns 7.8% on capital that costs 8.6%, a spread of -0.7pt, which leaves it short of the line in all 8 years covered here. Debt to equity of 0.79x against an industry median of 0.28x, with interest covered only 5.7x over, leaves the equity the most sensitive in the industry to any move in the cost of debt.
Two things complicate the picture, in opposite directions. Zain sold 8,069 towers to a PIF-led consortium in a deal completed in January 2023, so its capital expenditure of 4.5% of revenue is not comparable with peers who still own theirs: the economics did not vanish, they reappeared as lease payments. Against that, receivables are the industry's worst at 168 days outstanding against a median of 131, and that is a collections problem rather than a structural one, which means it is fixable.
The bet it made
Zain bought coverage. With the smallest budget of the three it bought the physics that lets a small network cover a large country, and it worked: Zain has the widest 5G availability in the Kingdom at 88%, achieved with no towers of its own and the smallest capital spending in the industry.
It is doubling down on assets it does not own. Zain was the first of the three to sell its towers, for SAR 3.03B in cash plus a retained 20% stake in the buyer. It took only low-band spectrum in the 2024 auction while operating in a market that increasingly asks for high-speed service, which leaves a network gap it can currently only fund on credit.
| 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| stc | 18.8% | 20.9% | 18.4% | 13.0% | 11.8% | 13.6% | 15.7% | 15.2% |
| Mobily | 15.1% | 15.6% | 24.5% | 15.0% | 15.5% | 12.1% | 14.7% | 16.4% |
| Zain KSA | 20.2% | 24.3% | 23.1% | 13.8% | 14.8% | 15.4% | 6.8% | 4.5% |
Where the money comes from
Retail
Zain is squeezed in the middle and has quietly stopped fighting on that ground. It cannot outspend stc and cannot out-discount Mobily, so it went sideways: Yaqoot as a separate cheap digital brand to compete on price, and Tamam, a consumer finance arm lending to customers it already has. Zain's answer to being third is to stop monetizing the SIM and start monetizing the relationship.
Enterprise
This is where Zain is weakest, and it is the direct cost of its own strategy. Enterprise is asset-heavy: fibre into the building, data centers to host the workload, security accreditations, a large field sales force. Zain sold its towers and runs deliberately asset-light. The same choice that makes it efficient in consumer coverage disqualifies it here.
Wholesale
Zain chose partnership over ownership. With no infrastructure of its own to rent out domestically, it works through Zain Omantel International and acts as the Saudi landing party for cables it does not own outright. Asset-light again, earning from the traffic without funding the pipe.
What it does with the money
Zain discloses no data-center capacity at all. On every layer of reinvestment it is getting access without paying for the asset, which is the cheapest way to run a network and the hardest way to build a moat.
Which leaves the sentence the whole company turns on: as a customer, Zain gives you the most. As an investor, so far, it has given you the least.
What comes back to shareholders
Of what it earned in FY2025, Zain KSA declared SAR 0.50 a share, 74.4% of net profit, against free cash flow of SAR 1.5B. Every riyal a telecom earns arrives at the same fork: back into the network, or out to shareholders. That ratio is the answer this one gave.
In context
This company only means something next to the other two and against the economics of the industry they share.
Read the industry piece See it against the others